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 Does National Context Affect Employee Reactions 
to Takeovers?  
A Policy-Capturing Study of the Predictors of Target 
Firm Member Trust after Acquisitions 
 
Günter K. Stahl • Chei Hwee Chua • Amy L. Pablo 
 
 
Abstract 
 In this study, we test the assumption that the way target firm employees respond to a 
takeover is contingent on their national origin.  
 The antecedents of target firm member trust in the acquiring firm management were 
examined in a cross-national sample of German and Singaporean employees using a 
policy-capturing design.  
 Five factors hypothesized to affect target firm member trust after a takeover were 
found to be significant influences on employees’ trust judgments in a decision-
making simulation: (i) combining firms’ collaboration history, (ii) mode of takeover, 
(iii) whether it was a domestic or cross-border acquisition, (iv) degree of autonomy 
removal, and (v) attractiveness of the acquiring firm’s human resource policies and 
reward system. Further analyses suggest that the relative importance of these factors 
in predicting target firm employees’ reactions to a takeover varies depending on their 
national origin. 
 We conclude that companies engaged in cross-border acquisitions need to consider 
contingencies in the cultural and institutional contexts in which the acquired firms are 
embedded and adapt their approaches for integrating them accordingly. 
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Does National Context Affect Employee Reactions 
to Takeovers?  
A Policy-Capturing Study of the Predictors of Target 
Firm Member Trust after Acquisitions 
 
Introduction 
There has been a dramatic growth in mergers and acquisitions [M&A] in the global marketplace 
during the last two decades. During this period, the global distribution of M&A has changed. One 
significant change is that the proportion of cross-border M&A increased from less than 30 percent 
in the year 2000 to almost half of the total value of global M&A at the end of the decade (Evans, 
Pucik, & Björkman, 2011). Even if the M&A fever subsides whenever the global economy cools 
off—such as after the dot.com-boom which ended in 2000, and during the global financial crisis 
that began in 2008 (World Investment Report, 2010) — a further increase in the number of cross-
border deals can be expected in the long run. 
Despite their popularity and strategic importance, the track record of such transactions is not 
very encouraging. A meta-analysis of 93 empirical studies conducted by King, Dalton, Daily and 
Covin (2004) revealed that the post-acquisition performance of acquiring firms fails to surpass 
that of non-acquiring firms, which suggests that anticipated synergies are often not realized. Of 
most interest to this paper’s central focus is that this meta-analysis showed that none of the most 
commonly researched antecedent variables (degree of diversification, degree of relatedness, 
method of payment, prior acquisition experience) were significant in explaining variance in post-
acquisition performance. King et al. (2004) conclude that “despite decades of research, what 
impacts the performance of firms engaging in M&A activity remains largely unexplained” (p. 
198). 
While attempts to explain M&A success and failure have traditionally focused on strategic 
and financial factors, an emergent and growing field of inquiry has been directed at the 
sociocultural and human resources issues involved in the integration of acquired or merging firms 
(Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006). Variables such as cultural fit (Björkman, Stahl & Vaara, 2007; 
Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee & Jayaraman, 2009), the pattern of dominance between merging 
firms (Hitt, Harrison & Ireland, 2001; Vaara, 2003), the combining firm’s interaction history 
(Porrini, 2004), issues of procedural and distributive justice (Ellis, Reus & Lamont, 2009; Meyer 
& Altenborg, 2007), attention to cultural and HR issues in the due diligence process (Gebhardt, 
2003; Stahl & Voigt, 2008), the acquiring managers’ leadership style (Kavanagh & Ashkanasy, 
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2006; Sitkin & Pablo, 2005) and, more broadly, the social climate surrounding a takeover 
(Birkinshaw, Bresman & Håkanson, 2000) have increasingly been recognized to be critical to the 
success of M&A. 
Another potentially important, but underexplored, factor in the success of M&A is trust. 
Indirect evidence about the critical role of trust in the M&A process can be drawn from a large 
body of research that suggests that development of trust is critical to the success of forming and 
implementing cooperative alliances between firms, such as joint ventures, R&D collaborations, 
and marketing partnerships (Child, 2001; Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Currall & Inkpen, 2002; Ring 
& Van de Ven, 1992; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998). Krishnan, Martin and Noorderhaven 
(2006) found that the benefits of trust on alliance performance are magnified when partner 
behavioral uncertainty is high. They argue that trust allows for the benefit of the doubt in 
interpreting partner actions. This facilitates openness in sharing knowledge and reduces fear of 
opportunistic behavior by alliance partners. This research is relevant to M&A, where behavioral 
uncertainty is generally high, especially among the acquired firm’s managers and employees. 
While few attempts have been made to systematically examine the role of trust in the context of 
M&A, qualitative case studies (e.g., Chua, Stahl & Engeli, 2005; Olie, 1994) as well as 
interviews with managers and employees affected by M&A (e.g., Krug & Nigh, 2001; Schweiger, 
Ivancevich & Power, 1987) suggest that trust is critical to the successful implementation of 
M&A. This is because trust helps management to overcome resistance and gain commitment 
from employees. The following quote from Novartis CEO, Daniel Vasella concerning the merger 
that created the Swiss pharmaceutical giant highlights both the importance and fragility of trust in 
M&A: 
Only in a climate of trust are people willing to strive for the slightly 
impossible, to make decisions on their own, to take initiative, to feel 
accountable. Trust is a prerequisite for working together effectively. … Among 
all the corporate values, trust was the one that suffered most from the merger. 
(Chua et al., 2005: 391-392) 
Despite the large body of anecdotal evidence supporting the critical role of trust in M&A, 
surprisingly little is known about the factors that facilitate or hinder the development of trust in 
acquired organizations. The benefits of trust and the damage incurred by trust violations make it 
essential to understand the conditions under which trust can develop after a takeover. The purpose 
of this paper is to identify important aspects of the acquirer-target relationship and the acquirer’s 
integration approach that would influence the emergence of trust in acquired organizations. 
Because of the popularity and growing importance of cross-border acquisitions (e.g., Chakrabarti 
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et al., 2009; Evans et al., 2011; Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004), another contribution 
of this study is that it tests whether target firm members’ reactions to a takeover are dependent on 
the national context in which they are embedded, thus requiring a country-compatible post-
acquisition integration strategy. To provide for the standardization and experimental control 
necessary to make cross-national comparisons, we used a decision-making simulation to examine 
the variables hypothesized to influence target firm member trust in the acquiring firm 
management in a cross-national sample of German and Singaporean employees. Since Germany 
and Singapore present interesting similarities and differences in their cultural and institutional 
contexts which are likely to influence how employees react to a takeover, comparing responses of 
employees from these two countries will enable us to gain insights into how effectiveness of 
M&A integration approaches may be contingent on the national context. 
 
Predictors of Target Firm Member Trust after a Takeover 
The Role of Trust in the Post-Acquisition Integration Process 
Research on trust within and between organizations has shown that trust exists at different levels. 
While most research on interorganizational trust has been carried out at the firm level of analysis 
(e.g., Ariño, de la Torre & Ring, 2001; Das & Teng, 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Vlaar et 
al., 2007), trust has also been conceptualized at the individual, dyadic or group level or as a 
multilevel phenomenon (see Currall & Inkpen, 2002). Since the focus of this study is on target 
firm member trust in the acquiring firm management, the level of analysis chosen for the trustor 
is the individual (i.e., members of the target firm). This conceptualization of trust is consistent 
with Zaheer et al.’s (1998) definition of interorganizational trust as “the extent of trust placed in 
the partner organization by the members of a focal organization” (p. 142). 
Central to most definitions of trust are the notions of risk and vulnerability. In the absence of 
risk, trust is irrelevant because there is no vulnerability (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Mayer et al., 
1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). In this study, we refer to trust as “a psychological state comprising 
the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior 
of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998: 395). Conversely, distrust can be defined as negative 
expectations of another’s intentions or behavior (Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Lewicki, McAllister, & 
Bies, 1998). This conceptualization of trust has also been applied to interorganizational 
relationships. For instance, in joint ventures, factors such as open communication and information 
exchange, task coordination, informal agreements, and levels of surveillance are all 
manifestations of trust based on a willingness to rely on, or be vulnerable to, another party under 
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a condition of risk (Currall & Inkpen, 2002; Inkpen & Currall, 1997). 
It has been observed that the turbulence following the announcement of a merger or an 
acquisition creates a breeding ground for distrust because the situation is unpredictable, easy to 
misinterpret, and people feel vulnerable (Hurley, 2006; Krug & Nigh, 2001; Stahl & Sitkin, 
2005). Social networks and mutual understanding established through years of working together 
are sometimes destroyed in an instant. With a new organization, a new top management team and 
a new superior, there is little trust initially and employees are left wondering what the next wave 
of changes will bring and whether they will be negatively affected (Lubatkin, Schweiger & 
Weber, 1999; Chua et al., 2005). Employees may perceive a merger as a psychological contract 
violation or a breach of trust, requiring renegotiation of the broken psychological contract (Buono 
& Bowditch, 1989; Weber & Drori, 2008). The period following the announcement of a takeover 
is thus one of intense risk assessment in which target firm employees have to judge whether the 
acquiring firm management can be trusted. 
Theoretical work on trust has suggested that trust can take various forms, ranging from 
cognitive-based (or “calculative”) trust, which is based on the predictability, dependability, and 
consistency of another party’s behavior, to affect-based (or “identification-based”) trust, which is 
rooted in emotional attachment and concern for the other party’s welfare (Lewicki et al., 2006; 
Mayer et al., 1995). Consistent with prior research on interorganizational trust, we focus mainly 
on calculus-based trust, which involves a predominantly cognitive assessment of others’ 
trustworthiness. This conceptualization of trust does not mean to imply that individuals affected 
by a takeover form an unbiased or reasonably accurate perception of the acquiring managers’ 
trustworthiness. Research suggests that following a takeover announcement, employees tend to 
place disproportionate weight on rumors and other unreliable information sources while 
selectively searching for, discounting, or reinterpreting important information (Kramer, 1999; 
Marks & Mirvis, 2001; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996). Given the limited amount of validated 
information that is available about the acquirer’s plans, motives and intentions, the effects of such 
perceptual and attributional biases on employees’ trust judgments may be profound. The 
cognitive-trust concept adopted in this study suggests that, however inaccurate or incomplete the 
information available in the aftermath of a takeover may be, target firm members will process that 
information through their own lenses in making inferences about the acquiring firm managers’ 
trustworthiness. 
 
Acquired Firm Member Trust: The Impact of National Context 
Cross-border M&A are particularly difficult to implement due to the embeddedness of the 
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combining organizations in their respective national contexts (e.g., Aguilera & Dencker, 2004; 
Child, Faulkner & Pitkethly, 2001; Krug & Nigh, 2001). Although research on cross-national 
variations in M&A is limited, there is some evidence that the way acquiring firms approach 
integration and the way target firm members respond to a takeover are contingent on their 
national origin (Goulet & Schweiger, 2006; Stahl & Javidan, 2009). For example, the results of a 
survey of European top executives regarding national perspectives on pre-acquisition due 
diligence suggest that cultural differences play an important role in affecting acquiring managers’ 
perceptions of target companies and their use of professional advisors in the pre-acquisition 
phase, both of which have implications for deal negotiation and subsequent management of the 
post-acquisition integration process (Angwin, 2001). 
In addition to national cultural characteristics, researchers have looked at aspects of the 
broader institutional environment within which M&A transactions take place (of which culture is 
one important component) to predict or explain differing national tendencies in integration 
processes. Calori, Lubatkin, Very, & Veiga (1997) have suggested that at the national level, 
social, political and legal institutions form the context in which managerial practices develop and 
are applied. Thus, differences in business systems, corporate governance structures, laws and 
regulations, labor management relations, and a host of other factors that vary across countries can 
result in distinct approaches to M&A and affect the M&A process (Angwin, 2001; Child et al., 
2001; Schuler, Jackson & Luo, 2004; Shimizu et al., 2004). The hostile takeover bid of 
Mannesmann by Vodafone, which we will analyze in more detail later, provides an instructive 
example. Vodafone not only had to deal with the German system of worker co-determination, but 
also with an entirely different ownership structure influenced by banks, opaque accounting and 
disclosure rules, a two-tiered board structure with a strong orientation towards consensus 
decision-making, different company laws, a German corporate culture with a strong orientation 
towards production and engineering, and a relatively weak ‘equity culture’ (Aguilera & Dencker, 
2004). 
While research on cross-national variations in M&A has, for the most part, examined 
whether acquirer’s preferences for different integration approaches vary depending on nationality, 
there has been limited research on how the institutional and cultural contexts within which target 
firms operate affect the integration process. A notable exception is a study of cross-border 
acquisitions conducted by Morosini and Singh (1994). They found that members of target firms 
in countries high on uncertainty avoidance tend to respond negatively when subjected to high 
levels of integration. Conversely, target firm members from national cultures low on uncertainty 
avoidance were found to respond more positively and perform more effectively when subjected to 
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higher levels of integration. These findings support the conclusion that a post-acquisition 
integration strategy that is consistent with the target firm’s national culture can improve cross-
border acquisition performance. 
In this study, we will consider various factors in the institutional and cultural contexts
1
 as 
potential influences on trust dynamics following a takeover. Differences in cultural norms and 
values do not only influence managerial practices (Hofstede, 1980; House, Hanges, Javidan, 
Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004) and, hence, approaches to M&A integration, but also set up 
expectations about behavior and provide a frame for interpreting others’ trustworthiness. 
Individuals from different cultures may thus have different expectations of what constitutes 
trustworthy behavior (e.g., Doney, Cannon & Mullen, 1998; Johnson & Cullen, 2001; Whitener, 
Maznevski, Hua, Saebo & Ekelund, 1999). For example, perceptions of acquiring managers’ 
trustworthiness may be rooted in demonstration of professional competence and open two-way 
communication in individualist cultures, and in behavioral consistency and demonstration of 
concern for the welfare of acquired employees in collectivist cultures. Employees from different 
cultures thus have diverse interpretive frameworks, rooted in their cultural norms and values that 
influence interpretations of their experiences in the organization (Whitener, 2006). To fully 
understand trust dynamics in cross-border M&A, it seems important to consider contingencies in 
the institutional and cultural contexts. 
To examine whether national origin affects target firm member trust, we developed a set of 
hypotheses concerning aspects of the acquirer-target relationship, as well as the acquirer’s 
integration approach, that are likely to influence target firm member trust, and tested them in a 
cross-national sample of German and Singaporean employees. German and Singaporean 
companies have been heavily involved in M&A activity over the past decade and both countries 
rank among the top five destinations for M&A activity in Europe and Asia, respectively, with 
cross-border deals accounting for about two thirds of all transactions in these countries (World 
Investment Report, 2010). By the first half of 2009, Singapore is among the top three economies 
for cross-border M&A sales in Asia, a position that is tied with Hong Kong (China), and trailing 
behind only India and China, while Germany holds a strong second position in Europe, behind 
United Kingdom (UNCTAD, 2009). Both Germany and Singapore can be classified as co-
ordinated market economies based on their financial and labor market systems (Hall & Soskice, 
2001), but they vary on a number of aspects in their institutional and cultural contexts as 
                                                     
1
 We recognize that the “cultural" and "institutional" contexts are overlapping since the normative 
and cultural-cognitive components of the institutional environment are conceptually close to 
culture (Scott, 1995; Kostova, 1999). 
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explained below. 
 
Predictors of Target Firm Member Trust: Cross-National Differences 
Stahl and Sitkin (2005, 2010) have suggested that target firm member trust in the acquiring firm 
management is affected by a set of status variables, which comprise aspects of the acquirer-target 
relationship at the time of the takeover, as well as process variables related to the acquirer’s 
integration approach. The distinction between status variables and process variables is consistent 
with a “process perspective” (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Jemison & 
Sitkin, 1986) on acquisitions. It proposes that the extent to which potential synergies can be 
realized depends on the ability of the acquirer to manage the integration process in an effective 
manner. In this study, we focus on factors that are likely to influence target firm member trust at 
an early stage of the integration process, following a takeover announcement, and for which we 
have evidence that their relative importance in predicting target firm members’ trust may vary 
depending on their national origin. These include: (i) combining firms’ collaboration history; (ii) 
mode of takeover; (iii) whether it is a domestic or cross-border acquisition; (iv) degree of 
autonomy removal; and (v) perceptions of attractiveness of the acquirer’s HR policies and reward 
system. 
 
Collaboration History 
Research on the role of trust in work groups, strategic alliances and socially embedded 
partnerships suggests that trust evolves over time through repeated interactions between partners 
(Gulati, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Zaheer et al., 1998). Like romantic relationships, 
interfirm relationships mature with interaction frequency, duration, and the diversity of 
challenges that partners encounter and face together (Lewicki et al., 1998). As Rousseau et al. 
(1998: 399) have noted, “[r]epeated cycles of exchange, risk taking, and successful fulfillment of 
expectations strengthen the willingness of trusting parties to rely upon each other and expand the 
resources brought into the exchange”. Furthermore, partners learn about each other’s 
idiosyncrasies and develop deeper mutual understanding over time, which improves the affective 
quality of the relationship (Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Parkhe, 1993). This indirect evidence from 
the alliance literature suggests that in acquisitions, familiarity through prior collaboration will 
facilitate the emergence of a shared identity and trust. 
While a history of collaboration is likely to be critical to both German and Singaporean 
takeover targets, we propose that the combining firms’ collaboration history has a relatively 
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greater influence on employees from cultures characterized by a strong relationship orientation 
than on those from more individualistic cultures. Based on the findings of the GLOBE research 
program, a study of cultural values and practices in 62 cultures (House et al., 2004), Singapore 
has significantly higher scores on institutional and in-group collectivism than Germany, reflecting 
the importance of strong ties and personal relationships in an Asian cultural context. Similarly, 
Hofstede’s (1980) landmark study of work-related values in 40 countries indicates that Singapore 
is significantly more collectivistic than Germany. Singapore is part of the Confucian Asia cultural 
cluster (along with countries like China, Taiwan, and South Korea), where great emphasis is 
placed on social networks and on building trust through personal contacts (Luo, 2000; Redding, 
1990). Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas and Svobodina (2004) have argued that in such a cultural 
context, managers of firms with whom a history of collaboration exists are more likely to be 
trusted because there is information on their actions in previous alliances. A history of 
collaboration thus represents a cumulative record of past behaviors that allows alliance partners to 
infer their partner’s future behavior (Parkhe, 1993). This logic applies equally well to M&A. If 
managers and employees from the companies involved in an M&A have prior experience 
collaborating on a joint venture or some other form of alliance, they are more likely to trust each 
other, especially in cultures where personal relationships are critical. In contrast, business 
transactions in individualistic cultures such as Germany are carried out largely on a calculated 
and contractual basis (Brodbeck, Frese & Javidan, 2002). Therefore, we propose that the positive 
impact of a collaboration history on trust is likely to be weaker for German takeover targets. The 
foregoing discussion suggests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: The level of target firm member trust in the acquiring firm management is 
positively related to the extent to which a history of collaboration exists between the two 
firms. 
Hypothesis 1b: National context moderates this relationship, such that the positive 
relationship between collaboration history and level of trust is stronger for Singaporeans 
than for Germans. 
 
Mode of Takeover 
Although M&A research has not directly addressed the relationship between mode of takeover 
and trust, it has been argued that hostile takeover tactics can result in sharp interorganizational 
conflict and difficulties integrating the acquired firm (Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Hambrick & 
Cannella, 1993; Hitt et al., 2001). According to Hunt (1990), the tone of the negotiations – 
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whether it is friendly or hostile – is an important influence on the post-acquisition integration 
success. This is because of its effect on the quality of the interpersonal relationships between 
members of the combining organizations. Friendliness is likely to generate perceptions of 
openness, goodwill, and trustworthiness (Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Stahl & Sitkin, 2010). In 
contrast, trust can erode when executives from a hostile takeover target and those of the acquiring 
firm battle each other in a public forum, each being suspicious of the other’s intentions and 
claiming the other party’s inadequacy and lack of integrity. Hambrick and Cannella (1993) have 
observed that the atmosphere surrounding a hostile takeover is often characterized by bitterness 
and acrimony, making smooth social integration after the deal less likely. Social Identity Theory 
(Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1982) suggests that under conditions of external threat, such as in a hostile 
takeover attempt, “us-versus-them” thinking is likely to set in, with individuals striving to 
maintain their positive social identity by idealizing their own group and denigrating the other. 
Support for this proposition can be found in research showing that hostile takeover attempts lead 
to resistance and increased cohesiveness among the target firm members (Elsass & Veiga, 1994; 
Krug & Nigh, 2001).  
While hostile takeover tactics are likely to have a universally negative effect on target 
employees’ trust and their willingness to collaborate, we propose that the mode of takeover has a 
relatively greater impact on German than Singaporean takeover targets. Germany has a 
‘stakeholder’ model of corporate governance, which emphasizes consensual decision-making, 
and the principles of ‘co-determination’ and collective bargaining. Banks provide substantial 
long-term corporate finance, act as stable shareholders, and protect companies against hostile 
takeovers (Aguilera & Dencker, 2004; Hoepner & Jackson, 2001). As a result, there are few 
hostile takeovers and when a hostile takeover is attempted, it typically causes public uproar. An 
example is the hostile takeover bid of Mannesmann by Vodafone. As mentioned previously, 
Vodafone not only had to deal with co-determination, but also with an entirely different 
ownership structure influenced by banks, a two-tiered board structure with a strong orientation 
towards consensus decision-making, different company laws, and a relatively weak ‘equity 
culture’ (Aguilera & Dencker, 2004; Hoepner & Jackson, 2001). It also had to deal with a 
German public that was vehemently opposed to the takeover bid, as evidenced by the warning 
given by Gerhard Schröder, the Chancellor of Germany at that time, that a hostile takeover would 
“destroy the corporate culture” and undermine the principle of co-determination (Hoepner & 
Jackson, 2001: 36). These features contrast with the market- and shareholder-oriented logic of 
Anglo-American corporate governance adopted in the non-government-linked sector in 
Singapore, where corporations lack protection against hostile takeover bids and the business 
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community and general public tend to view these types of transactions as legitimate
2
. The above 
arguments lead to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: The level of target firm member trust in the acquiring firm management is 
positively related to the friendliness of the takeover. 
Hypothesis 2b: National context moderates this relationship, such that the positive 
relationship between takeover friendliness and level of trust is stronger for Germans than 
for Singaporeans. 
 
Cross-border versus Domestic 
Research suggests that managers and employees affected by acquisitions are likely to differ in 
their attitudes and reactions depending on whether the acquirer is a local or a foreign company 
(Angwin, 2001; Calori et al., 1994; Krug & Nigh, 2001; Weber et al., 1996). For example, Krug 
and Nigh (2001), based on surveys and interviews with executives of US target companies, found 
that a greater number of executives in foreign acquisitions were terminated and those who left 
voluntarily complained more frequently about lower job status than executives in domestic 
acquisitions. Most of these executives left shortly after the takeover as both companies struggled 
to overcome cultural barriers that hindered the integration process. Although studies that tested 
the cultural distance hypothesis in the context of M&A have yielded inconclusive results (see 
Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Stahl, 2008; Stahl & Voigt, 2008; Teerikangas & Very, 2006; 
Weber & Drori, 2008 for reviews), research has shown that shared norms and values facilitate the 
development of trust and the emergence of a shared identity (Lewicki et al., 1998; Sarkar et al., 
1997). Conversely, trust can erode and the potential for conflict can increase when a person or 
group is perceived as not sharing key values (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Social Identity Theory 
(Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1982) suggests that in a merger situation, the mere existence of two 
different cultures is enough to lead to in-group out-group bias (e.g., Hogg & Terry, 2000; 
Kleppestø, 2005; Elsass & Veiga, 1994). In-group bias and out-group derogation are likely to be 
greatest when the out-group is perceived to be very different from the in-group, such as in cross-
border acquisitions (Björkman et al., 2007). In international acquisitions, feelings of mistrust may 
                                                     
2
 The Singaporean model defies easy categorization (like most Asian economies), partly because 
governance structures differ substantially between government-linked and non-government-linked 
companies. However, corporate governance practices in non-government-linked companies show the 
influence of the Anglo-American ‘shareholder’ model (see Governance Primer Asia, 2001). 
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be further fueled by cultural stereotypes, nationalism and xenophobia (Teerikangas & Very, 2006; 
Vaara, 2003). 
While we expect both German and Singaporean takeover targets to be similarly affected by 
these cultural dynamics, there are reasons to believe that Singaporeans are better equipped to 
cope with the challenges involved in cross-border takeovers. Singapore is a multicultural society 
where people are accustomed to dealing with cultural differences in both their work and personal 
life. In Singapore, the government’s policy is for all citizens to be bilingual, and nearly 80 percent 
of the citizens support having people of different ethnic groups living in Singapore and believe 
that multiculturalism is vital to uniting the nation (Latif, 2002). Furthermore, Singapore stands in 
stark contrast to Germany in terms of openness as a host economy for foreign investment and 
percentage of total employment by affiliates of foreign multinationals with a Host Economy 
Transnationality index of 65.2% compared to Germany’s 10.4% (UNCTAD, 2008)3. 
Singaporeans are thus more likely to have experience working for a foreign company and/or are 
accustomed to the prospect of working for one. Germany, on the other hand, is a much more 
culturally homogeneous society and is grappling with issues of multi-ethnicity and 
multiculturalism (Hertkorn, 2000). A minority of Germans are fluent in English, which is likely to 
augment cultural and communication problems in cross-border M&A. For example, in the 
DaimlerChrysler merger, while most managers on the Daimler side could speak some English, few 
were able to do so with the ease and accuracy that is needed for effective working relationships 
(Vlasic & Stertz, 2000). Collectively, these arguments lead to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: The level of target firm member trust in the acquiring firm management is 
higher in domestic than in cross-border acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 3b: National context moderates this relationship, such that the more negative 
effect of cross-border acquisition on trust compared to that of domestic acquisition is 
stronger for Germans than for Singaporeans. 
 
Autonomy Removal 
Although, theoretically, integration can result in a balanced merging of two organizations, 
                                                     
3
 The Host Economy Transnationality Index is calculated from the average of the four shares: FDI inflows 
as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation; FDI inward stocks as a percentage of GDP; value added of 
foreign affiliates as a percentage of GDP; and employment of foreign affiliates as a percentage of total 
employment. The reported statistics are UNCTAD estimates for 2005 – latest year available. 
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cultures and workforces, this balance rarely occurs in acquisitions. Instead, the acquirer typically 
removes autonomy from the target firm and imposes a rigorous set of rules, systems, and 
performance expectations upon it in order to gain quick control (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Marks 
& Mirvis, 2001; Pablo, 1994). Autonomy removal can be devastating from the perspective of 
target firm members and lead to resistance and hostility (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Krug & 
Nigh, 2001), as managers and employees vigorously defend their autonomy – a situation that 
Datta and Grant (1990) have termed the “conquering army syndrome.” Moreover, because tight 
controls tend to signal the absence of trust, the use of controls typically hampers its emergence, 
often resulting in a cycle of escalating distrust and conflict (Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Jemison & 
Sitkin, 1986). In such a situation, the acquirer’s executives may be perceived as uniformly 
malevolent and not to be trusted, especially if target firm members perceive a gap between the 
acquirer’s stated goals and intentions (e.g., a “merger of equals”), and the actual integration 
approach taken, as could be observed in the case of the DaimlerChrysler “merger” (Epstein, 2004; 
Gebhardt, 2003). 
While autonomy removal is likely to have a universally negative effect on the emergence of 
trust between acquiring and target firms, we expect this aspect of the integration approach to play 
a bigger role in the case of German employees than Singaporean ones. How individuals react to 
autonomy removal in the aftermath of a takeover is likely to depend on the level of power 
distance in a culture (Angwin, 2001; Goulet & Schweiger, 2006). Power distance reflects the 
extent to which a society accepts and endorses authority, status privileges, and unequal power 
distribution in organizations (Hofstede, 1980). Higher power distance indicates a greater 
acceptance and reliance on centralization of authority. Thus, in societies with higher power 
distance, subordinates tend to display a greater tolerance for lack of autonomy, and they are 
accustomed to taking orders from their supervisors. Various studies have found that job autonomy 
or empowerment has a stronger effect on job satisfaction in lower power-distance cultures than in 
higher power-distance cultures (e.g. Hui, Au, & Fock, 2004; DeCarlo & Agarwal, 1999). 
Conversely, we can expect autonomy removal to be met with less negative reactions in higher 
power-distance cultures than in lower power-distance cultures. Comparative studies have shown 
that Germany has significantly lower power distance scores than Singapore and most other Asian 
countries (Hofstede, 1980; House et al., 2004). German takeover targets are thus more likely to 
respond negatively when subjected to high levels of integration and a resulting loss of autonomy 
than do Singaporean takeover targets. Consistent with this analysis, Angwin (2001) has argued 
that German employees are not accustomed to high levels of supervision and control, and that this 
must be considered in pre-acquisition due diligence as it is likely to cause problems during 
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integration. Taken together, these arguments support the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: The level of target firm member trust in the acquiring firm management is 
negatively related to autonomy removal. 
Hypothesis 4b: National context moderates this relationship, such that the negative 
relationship between autonomy removal and level of trust is stronger for Germans than 
for Singaporeans. 
 
Attractiveness of Acquirer’s HR Policies and Reward System 
Finally, we propose that attractiveness of the acquirer’s HR policies and reward system may 
affect trust dynamics in acquired organizations. More generally, there is evidence that expected 
benefits of organizational changes resulting from the takeover, particularly the quality of post-
acquisition reward and job security changes, is a critical factor in determining employees’ 
reactions to an acquisition (Chaudhuri, 2005; Evans et al., 2011; Van Dick et al., 2006). For 
instance, Bartels et al. (2006) revealed that expected utility of the merger (anticipated benefits 
such as salary increases or more job security) was the strongest predictor of employees’ 
identification with the post-merger organization. If target firm members see the takeover as a 
chance for more job security and increased prospects for compensation and promotion, they are 
more likely to have a positive attitude towards the acquirer (Evans et al., 2011; Schweiger, 2002). 
This is especially true when target firm employees see the acquiring company as a savior or 
having a more enlightened culture, or when they see other positive outcomes from an association 
with the acquiring company, such as higher prestige or better career opportunities. Cisco, for 
example, buys companies for their technology and R&D talent and then assimilates them into the 
Cisco culture, but it attempts to retain most of the employees and provides strong financial 
incentives, excellent career opportunities, and promotes a vision of the merged entity that 
includes an important role for the acquired employees to play. Such recognition and incentives 
help to build trust and encourage acquired employees to stay (Chaudhuri, 2005).  
We predict that expected benefits associated with changes resulting from a takeover, 
particularly potential improvements in HR policies and reward system, will have a positive effect 
on target employees’ reactions to a takeover largely independent of their nationality. There is 
some evidence to suggest that Singaporeans, maybe more so than Germans, are “preoccupied 
with acquiring material possessions” (Jung, 2001, p. 4), and that aspects like high compensation, 
HR development, and career advancement opportunities figure prominently in their career 
decisions. Also, in the absence of a well-developed centralized social security system with 
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comprehensive welfare benefits such as in Germany, Singaporeans’ welfare and retirement 
benefits are directly linked to the rewards and benefits system provided by their companies 
(Asher, 1995). However, there is little theoretical clarity concerning how these institutional 
factors might differentially affect the reactions of Singaporean and German employees to a 
takeover, particularly their level of trust in the acquirer. We explore this issue in our policy-
capturing study and posit a non-directional moderator hypothesis. Taken together, the above 
arguments support the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5a: The level of target firm member trust in the acquiring firm management is 
positively related to attractiveness of the acquirer’s HR policies and reward system. 
Hypothesis 5b: National context moderates this relationship, such that the relationship 
between attractiveness of acquirer’s HR policies and reward system and level of trust is 
different for Singaporean and German employees. 
Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships. 
____________________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
____________________________________ 
 
Methods 
Sample 
We tested the hypotheses in a cross-national sample of German and Singaporean employees. Data 
were collected through a survey questionnaire. The questionnaire was sent via regular mail or 
email to 403 German and 600 Singaporean target respondents, along with a letter requesting their 
participation. 206 Germans and 228 Singaporeans completed and returned the questionnaire, for a 
response rate of 51% and 38% for the German and Singaporean samples, respectively. 30 
returned questionnaires were unusable, resulting in a final sample size of 404 (197 Germans and 
207 Singaporeans). The sample consisted of Germans and Singaporeans who were working in 
multinational corporations, except for a couple of MBA students who had at least several years of 
working experience. Among the German respondents, 45.7% were in managerial positions, 
31.5% had a college education, 62.9% were male, 38.6% were at least 40 years old, and 63.5% 
had experienced an acquisition while working with their current/previous employers. Among the 
Singaporean respondents, 68.8% were in managerial positions, 70.0% had a college education, 
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48.8% were male, 28.5% were at least 40 years old, and 48.8% had experienced an acquisition 
while working with their current/previous employers.  
 
Research Design and Survey Questionnaire 
We used the policy capturing method to test our hypotheses. Policy capturing is a concept derived 
from social judgment theory and has been used to study an array of decision-making processes 
within organizational contexts, including job choice decisions (Judge & Bretz, 1992), judgments 
of sexual harassment (York, 1989), alliance partner selection (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle & 
Borza, 2000; Hitt et al., 2004), integration decisions in acquisitions (Pablo, 1994), and 
willingness to reconcile a relationship following a trust violation (Tomlinson, Dineen & Lewicki, 
2004). Policy capturing involves presenting respondents with a set of scenarios in which multiple 
theoretically determined decision criteria are embedded, and asking respondents to make 
decisions based on each scenario. The decision criteria used by the respondent (constituting the 
independent variables) are then identified from the specific decisions made (constituting the 
dependent variable) (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). 
The policy-capturing methodology is particularly suited for use in our study which seeks to 
examine how our hypothesized variables influence target firm member trust decisions following a 
takeover and to make cross-national comparisons. This method provides several benefits that are 
necessary for our study over other methods. First, it offers the standardization and experimental 
control to enable us to examine how our respondents “weight, combine, or integrate information” 
when making their trust decisions (Zedeck, 1977:51). Second, it provides a higher degree of 
control over confounding variables (Aiman-Smith, Scullen & Barr, 2002) as respondents are 
asked to make their trust decisions solely based on the five variables that are of interest to this 
study. Third, unlike other methods (e.g. the self-report attribute ratings method) where social 
desirability response bias can occur, this method uses indirect assessment of the importance of 
hypothesized variables which weakens the occurrence of this potential bias (Arnold & Feldman, 
1981; Judge & Bretz, 1992). Fourth, this method avoids problems of retrospective bias associated 
with some survey techniques (e.g., Golden, 1992; Hitt et al., 2004). 
In constructing the acquisition scenarios, we embedded the five factors hypothesized to 
influence target firm member trust as decision criteria in the scenarios. We varied each of the five 
factors at two levels as illustrated by Table 1 (e.g. friendly mode of takeover or hostile mode of 
takeover). With five factors and each having two possible levels, a full factorial experimental 
design (Cochran & Cox, 1957) would yield a total of 32 possible distinct scenarios (2 x 2 x 2 x 2 
x 2). In other words, there can be a total of 32 scenarios where each scenario would portray at 
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least one factor at a different level. Since fractional designs produce substantially the same results 
as a full factorial design for nomothetic research (Graham & Cable, 2001), we used a one-half 
fractional replication. Such a fractional design gives us the benefit of reducing respondent 
overload and fatigue that might unduly affect the results. Since a full factorial design consists of 
32 scenarios, an one-half fractional replication results in two different sets of 16 scenarios (½ x 2 
x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2). They became part of two questionnaires, respectively. To control for effects of 
order on responses, we varied the sequencing of the two sets of 16 scenarios and created another 
two questionnaires. Hence, we had four questionnaires where each questionnaire contained 16 
acquisition scenarios for respondents to evaluate and make their trust decisions. Respondents 
were randomly assigned to one of the four questionnaires. Our data collection proceeded in 
phases so that we were able to ensure that for each sample, we had almost the same number of 
completed usable questionnaires for each of the four questionnaires. 
____________________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
____________________________________ 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable was the level of target firm member trust in the acquiring firm 
management. Respondents were instructed to adopt the perspective of a target firm member and, 
after reviewing each acquisition scenario, to indicate on a five-point Likert-type scale, ranging 
from 1 (very little extent) to 5 (very great extent), the extent to which they would trust the 
acquiring firm management. Pretest findings indicated that a five-item scale measuring different 
components of trust (acquiring managers’ perceived trustworthiness in terms of their competence, 
integrity, benevolence, openness, and value congruence) yielded comparable results to the item 
measuring overall trust. Therefore, the single-item solution was chosen. 
 
Independent variables 
The independent variables were the five hypothesized predictors of trust. They varied at two 
levels across the scenarios as illustrated by Table 1. A dummy variable was created for each 
variable: collaboration history (0 = no history; 1 = a history of collaboration); mode of takeover  
(0 = hostile; 1 =  friendly); domestic vs. cross-border acquisition (0 = cross-border; 1 = 
domestic); autonomy removal (0 = low; 1 = high); attractiveness of acquirer’s HR policies and 
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reward system (0 = low; 1 = high). 
 
Control variables 
Since it is possible that certain respondent demographic characteristics might potentially 
influence their trust decisions, we controlled for age, gender, educational level, position level in 
the company, and prior experience with an acquisition situation in the tests for differences 
between the German and Singaporean decision models. A dummy variable was created for each 
variable: age (0 = below 40 years old; 1 = at least 40 years old); gender (0 = female; 1 = male); 
educational level (0 = without college education; 1 = at least college education); position level (0 
= non-managerial; 1 = managerial); acquisition experience  (0 = no prior experience with an 
acquisition situation; 1 = prior experience with an acquisition situation). 
 
Moderator 
A dummy variable was created representing the respondent’s nationality (0 = German; 1 = 
Singaporean). 
 
Pretesting, Translation and Back-Translation 
Pretesting was done at several stages of the development of the original German language version 
of the questionnaire, using graduate students and employees of German companies. Pretests 
involved reading the instructions and scenarios for clarity. Testing was also done to examine the 
perceived validity of the scenarios, efficacy of the variables, and amount of time required to 
complete the questionnaire. Revisions were made at each stage of pretesting. As a result of the 
pilot tests, the scenarios used in the final questionnaires were considerably shorter and less 
elaborate than those used in the original pilot test. Subsequently, the German language version 
was translated into English for the Singaporean sample. Based on methodological guidelines by 
Brislin (1986), the questionnaire was translated and back-translated by effectively bilingual 
translators to ensure semantic equivalence between the two versions. 
 
Results 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for all variables. 
 18 
____________________________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
____________________________________ 
To test Hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, and 5a, we developed models for the German and 
Singaporean respondents, respectively using hierarchical linear modeling [HLM] (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). HLM has been recommended for analyzing policy-capturing data (Hitt et al., 2000; 
Hitt et al., 2004). It is able to overcome the statistical weaknesses of traditional methods for 
analyzing nested data (Hoffman, 1997). In this study, there were 16 observations per respondent. 
Thus, observations were nested within respondents. Altogether, there were 3151 observations for 
German respondents (1 missing value), and 3286 observations for Singaporean respondents (26 
missing values), resulting in a total of 6437 observations for the full sample of 404 respondents. 
Since the 16 observations for each respondent may not necessarily be independent, using HLM is 
advantageous because it controls for potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Hoffman, 
1997). Moreover, HLM is able to assess between-respondents variance and group effects while 
controlling for within-respondent variance (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
The original HLM results have been rearranged for easy understanding in Table 3. The 
coefficients can be interpreted like those of ordinary least squares regression analysis 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The results show that all coefficients were statistically significant (p 
< 0.01), suggesting that collaboration history, mode of takeover, domestic vs. cross-border 
acquisition, autonomy removal, and attractiveness of acquirer’s HR policies and reward system 
were significant predictors of respondents’ trust judgments. The direction of effects was as 
hypothesized in all cases, except for the effect of domestic vs. cross-border acquisition in the 
Singaporean model. As hypothesized, the level of trust was lower in a cross-border than in a 
domestic acquisition situation for German respondents. However, the opposite was observed for 
Singaporean respondents. Thus, Hypotheses 1a, 2a, 4a and 5a were supported while Hypothesis 
3a was only supported by the German sample. 
____________________________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
____________________________________ 
Since the independent variables have relatively equal standard errors, it is possible to infer 
the relative strength of the five trust predictors from the coefficients (Hitt et al., 2000; Hitt et al., 
2004). The results presented in Table 3 indicate that attractiveness of the acquirer’s HR policies 
and reward system was the strongest predictor in both German and Singaporean models. For 
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German respondents, the second strongest predictor was mode of takeover, followed by 
autonomy removal, domestic vs. cross-border acquisition, and collaboration history (in 
descending order of strength). For Singaporean respondents, collaboration history was the second 
strongest predictor, followed by mode of takeover, autonomy removal, and domestic vs. cross-
border acquisition. 
Next, we tested for differences between the German and Singaporean models (Hypotheses 
1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, and 5b), while controlling for demographic differences between them, including 
age, gender, educational level, position level, and prior acquisition experience. To do so, we used 
HLM analysis with a combined German and Singaporean sample. The original HLM results are 
again rearranged and edited for easy understanding in Table 4. A significant interaction effect 
between nationality and a predictor variable indicates that the relationship between that particular 
predictor variable and level of trust varied significantly between German and Singaporean 
respondents. The results show that the coefficients of four of the interaction terms (Collaboration 
History*Nationality; Friendliness of Takeover *Nationality; Domestic vs. Cross-
border*Nationality; Autonomy Removal*Nationality) were statistically significant at p < 0.001. 
This suggests that respondents’ national origin moderated the relationship between these four 
predictors and trust. The direction of effects was as hypothesized. Thus, Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b 
and 4b were supported. The relationship between attractiveness of acquirer’s HR policies and 
reward system and trust did not vary significantly between German and Singaporean respondents. 
Hence, Hypothesis 5b was not supported. 
____________________________________ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
____________________________________ 
 
Discussion 
Prior research on post-acquisition integration has paid little attention to the conditions that 
facilitate or impede the development of trust in acquired companies. We proposed that aspects of 
the acquirer-target relationship and the way the acquirer approaches integration will affect 
employees’ reactions to a takeover, and identified a set of variables that are likely to influence the 
level of trust in the acquiring firm management. Given the increasing importance of cross-border 
acquisitions, we examined whether the hypothesized trust antecedents vary across different 
national groups. We selected Germany and Singapore because these countries rank among the top 
destinations for cross-border M&A activity in their respective regions and, more importantly, 
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because they vary on a number of institutional and cultural dimensions that are likely to affect the 
development of trust in M&A. We predicted several differences regarding how employees would 
react to a takeover based on their nationality, and our predictions were largely supported by the 
results of a policy-capturing study. 
The findings show that there are similarities, as well as some important differences in the 
way German and Singaporean employees reacted to the takeover scenarios presented to them. By 
comparing and contrasting employee responses to takeovers from two globally important regions, 
Western Europe and Southeast Asia, this study adds to our understanding of how effectiveness of 
M&A integration approaches is contingent on the national context. Among the five factors 
hypothesized to affect trust, attractiveness of the acquirer’s HR policies and reward system was 
by far the most powerful predictor of both German and Singaporean respondents’ trust 
judgments. This finding is consistent with research that shows that the way employees react to a 
takeover depends to a large extent on the personal benefits and losses attributed to the takeover 
(e.g., Cartwright & Cooper, 1996; Chaudhuri, 2005; Evans et al., 2002). It is also consistent with 
research on organizational trust that suggests that employees’ trust in management is rooted in the 
fairness and support they perceive in the organization’s HR policies and practices (Whitener, 
2006). In the aftermath of a takeover, not only do the acquirer’s HR policies and practices have a 
major impact on acquired employees’ careers, they also reveal much about the acquiring 
executives’ integrity, fairness, and concern – and, thus, their trustworthiness. 
Goulet and Schweiger (2006), in a review of research on the role of culture in M&A, have 
argued that “acquirers may be culturally predisposed in the way they approach integration, and 
that targets may be culturally predisposed in the way they respond to integration” (p. 410). While 
there is substantial evidence that acquirers from different countries have different perspectives on 
how integration should be approached and how to deal with post-acquisition issues (e.g., Aguilera 
& Dencker, 2004; Stahl & Javidan, 2009; Child et al., 2001), there is little research comparing 
employees’ reactions across national contexts. This study fills the lacuna by showing that the way 
employees perceive and react to an acquirer’s integration approach is contingent on their national 
origin. As predicted, Germans and Singaporeans differed significantly in the way they responded 
to the takeover scenarios presented to them, after controlling for variables such as age, gender, 
educational level, position level, and prior acquisition experience. While German employees 
responded more negatively to hostile takeover tactics, autonomy removal, and acquisition by a 
foreign company, Singaporean employees placed more emphasis on the history of collaboration 
between the combining firms and tended to distrust acquirers with whom they had no prior 
experience collaborating on a joint venture or some other form of alliance. 
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These differences can be partly explained by cultural factors. For example, Singaporeans, 
coming from a society that accepts authority and power differences (Hofstede, 1980; House et al., 
2004), may be more tolerant of acquirer dominance than Germans, who, due to their cultural 
background, are likely to resent dominance and may thus resist an acquiring firm’s attempts to 
“make them like us” (Angwin, 2001). Also, like most countries in Asia, Singapore is high on 
institutional and in-group collectivism (House et al., 2004), reflecting the importance of strong 
ties and personal relationships in business dealings. In collectivist countries, much emphasis is 
placed on building trust through personal contacts and collaboration over time (e.g., Hitt et al., 
2004; Luo, 2000; Redding, 1990). To Singaporean respondents, the existence of a history of 
collaboration may have indicated the strength and quality of the relationship between the two 
firms – and, thus, the acquiring management’s trustworthiness. 
One of the most interesting results of this study is the difference between German and 
Singaporean employees in how they responded to the situation of a cross-border takeover. While 
the prospect of being acquired by a foreign firm had a negative impact on Germans’ trust 
judgments, Singaporeans seemed to welcome a takeover by a foreign company. To explain this 
finding, it is necessary to look at the broader institutional context that may shape individuals’ 
reactions to a takeover. In Germany, there is a long established tradition of industrial democracy 
through powerful workers’ councils that is reinforced by a system of worker co-determination 
(Jackson, Hoepner & Kurdelbusch, 2004).
4
 HRM practices include more restricted employer 
autonomy, difficult hiring and firing decisions, lower employee mobility, and a stronger link 
between seniority and career progression (e.g., Aguilera & Dencker, 2004; Sparrow, Schuler & 
Jackson, 1994). Most German companies offer job security, social benefits and predictable 
careers in return for employee commitment and loyalty. In fact, German employees’ overriding 
attribute is loyalty to the company and an emphasis on security (Angwin, 2001). In such a 
context, employees are less likely to welcome an acquisition by a foreign company. On the 
contrary, most Singaporean employees prefer to work for subsidiaries of foreign companies in 
Singapore, which are thought to have more sophisticated HR practices and generally offer more 
attractive benefits and better career opportunities than homegrown Singaporean companies (Wan, 
2006). 
The foregoing discussion suggests that in order to understand country-specific biases in the 
                                                     
4
 Since the mid-1990s, corporate governance has changed dramatically in Germany. However, changes in 
the corporate landscape and firm governance have not undermined employee codetermination, collective 
bargaining institutions, and labor-management- relations in Germany (see Jackson et al., 2004). 
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way employees respond to M&A, a thorough analysis of the cultural and institutional contexts is 
necessary. 
 
Limitations and Implications for Research  
This study has provided some new insights into the antecedents of target firm member trust in the 
aftermath of a takeover. However, there are several possible limitations that need to be discussed, 
as well as avenues for future research. 
Perhaps the most critical question is related to the external validity of the findings, i.e., 
whether the results of policy-capturing research can be generalized to real-world situations. This 
study used hypothetical scenarios to simulate individuals’ trust decisions in the context of a 
corporate takeover. This design allowed us to examine how employees make trust judgments in a 
variety of takeover situations, and it provided the control required to isolate the unique 
independent effects of the hypothesized factors. However, employees may respond differently to 
hypothetical situations compared to similar actual situations. Although research has suggested 
that intentions can predict subsequent behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and results from 
contrived situations used in policy capturing have been found to be consistent with results 
obtained in real-world situations (Brown, 1972; Hitt & Middlemist, 1979; Pablo, 1994), the 
external validity of the findings can only be established through further research using alternative 
methodologies, such as in-depth interviews and survey designs. 
Another possible limitation to the external validity of the findings should be noted. The 
simulation of individuals’ decision processes through policy capturing allows for evaluation of 
how respondents use a limited set of criteria to make judgments in a specific domain. To the 
extent that additional variables outside the set of trust antecedents examined in this study affect 
employees’ trust judgments, the decision models obtained through the policy capturing approach 
are likely to be incomplete. One fruitful avenue for future research is to investigate the role of 
implementation factors that have not been tested in this study, including speed of integration, 
social integration mechanisms used, aspects of the communication process during integration, etc. 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Hitt et al., 2001; Schweiger, 2002). 
In addition to those already suggested, several interesting research opportunities can evolve 
from this research. Although the dependent variable of interest was trust, our discussion suggests 
that the variables hypothesized to affect target firm member trust may affect a range of behavioral 
and attitudinal outcomes. For example, research has shown that departure rates of executives 
from the acquired firms depend on factors related to the acquirer-target relationship and the 
integration approach such as preacquisition performance differences between the acquiring and 
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target firms, friendliness of the takeover, and removal of autonomy from target firm executives 
(Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Lubatkin, Schweiger & Weber, 1999). The policy-capturing 
method seems well-suited for examining how these and other preacquisition and implementation 
factors may affect employees’ willingness to stay after a takeover and whether the effects of these 
factors vary across different national groups. 
In this study, we left unexamined the question of whether trust is of any consequence to the 
post-acquisition performance of the combining firms. There is a myriad of anecdotal evidence – 
mainly from M&A case studies and interviews with acquired employees – that suggests that trust 
does matter in M&A; but when it matters, under what conditions it matters, and how it matters 
are currently poorly understood. Future research – and management practice as well – would 
benefit from a closer examination of the conditions that facilitate or hinder the development of 
trust in the aftermath of M&A. 
 
Implications for Practice 
Consistent with a “process perspective” on acquisitions (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991), this study 
points to the crucial role played by the acquirer’s integration approach and practices in ensuring 
acquisition success. A number of actions can be taken by the acquiring firm management to build 
trust and secure commitment from acquired employees. Given the importance of the acquirer’s 
HR policies and reward system in influencing target employees’ trust, it seems essential to design 
and implement “high commitment” HR policies and practices (Arthur, 1994; Becker, Huselid & 
Ulrich, 2001) that benefit target firm members. HR policies and practices that are perceived as 
transparent and fair, financial incentives to employees who ought to be retained, and adequate 
support to those who are negatively affected by the takeover can go a long way towards building 
trust and securing commitment from acquired employees (e.g., Chaudhuri, 2005; Chua et al., 
2005; Evans et al., 2002; Schuler et al., 2004). Based on the findings of this study, carefully 
setting the appropriate tone during and after the negotiations, providing opportunities for 
interaction between members of the combining organizations, and resisting the temptation to 
remove more autonomy from the target firm than the strategic rationale of the deal requires are 
also essential for building trust and commitment. 
Perhaps most importantly, the results of this study suggest that companies engaged in cross-
border acquisitions need to adapt their approaches for integrating acquired firms. They need to 
understand that target employees in other countries may react differently to their integration 
approach, and that sometimes a “culture-compatible” (Morosini & Singh, 1994) post-acquisition 
integration strategy may be required. Executives involved in cross-border acquisitions must have 
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a thorough understanding of both the target firm’s cultural and institutional contexts and their 
own if the post-acquisition integration is to be successful (Aguilera & Dencker, 2004; Calori et 
al., 1994; Goulet & Schweiger, 2006). This means that cultural issues have to be considered 
during the early stage of the acquisition process – as early as during the evaluation of a suitable 
target and planning of the post-acquisition integration. In the due diligence phase, learning about 
the “soft” factors influencing acquisition success is just as important as financial analysis and 
strategic fit considerations (Evans et al., 2002). 
This recommendation, however, does not mean that acquisitions should be limited to firms 
in countries with similar cultures and institutional environments. This would be both unrealistic 
and unwise. It is unrealistic because in today’s global business environment, in which M&A 
activity is mainly driven by strategic imperatives, few companies can afford the luxury of 
avoiding potential deals on account of cultural issues. It would be unwise because research 
suggests that acquisitions in unfamiliar markets and cultures can enhance a firm’s competitive 
advantage by providing access to unique and potentially valuable capabilities that are embedded 
in a different cultural and institutional environment (Morosini, et al., 1998; Olie & Verwaal, 
2004; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). But this does not mean that cultural and institutional 
differences can be ignored. Quite the contrary, because they are so critical, they have to be 
understood and well managed. 
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Fig. 1: Predictors of Target Firm Member Trust 
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Table 1: Decision Criteria Embedded in Acquisition Scenarios 
 Note: 
a
 Excerpts from the acquisition scenarios contained in the questionnaire. 
Independent Variable Operationalization
a
 
Collaboration history The companies have a history of 
collaboration, and you have some 
personal contact with members of 
the acquiring firm. 
There is no history of 
collaboration and you do not have 
any personal contact with 
members of the acquiring firm. 
Friendliness of 
takeover 
The management of your company 
supports the takeover. 
The takeover is against the will of 
the management of your company. 
Domestic  vs. cross-
border acquisition 
Your company is being acquired by 
another Singaporean/German firm. 
Your company is being acquired 
by a foreign firm. 
Autonomy removal There are indications that your 
company will be allowed to retain 
its own culture and much of its 
autonomy during consolidation. 
There are indications that the 
acquiring firm is likely to impose 
its culture and systems on your 
company during consolidation. 
Attractiveness of 
acquirer’s HR 
policies and reward 
system 
The acquiring firm’s HR policies 
and reward system are known to be 
employee-friendly. 
The acquiring firm’s HR policies 
and reward system are known to 
be employee-unfriendly. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
a 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Trust Level 2.45 1.02            
2. Collaboration History  0.50 0.50 0.15***           
3. Mode of Takeover  0.49 0.50 0.21*** 0.01          
4. Domestic vs. Cross-
border Acquisition  
0.50 0.50 0.04** 0.04** 0.01         
5. Autonomy Removal  0.50 0.50 -0.13*** 0.02 -0.01 0.02        
6. Attractiveness of 
Acquirer’s HR 
Policies & Reward 
System  
0.50 0.50 0.44*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00       
7. Age 0.33 0.47 -0.07*** -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00      
8. Gender 0.56 0.50 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.23***     
9. Educational Level 0.51 0.50 -0.03* 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.14** 0.06***    
10. Position Level  0.57 0.50 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.25***   
11. Acquisition 
Experience  
0.56 0.50 -0.03* -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.19*** 0.05*** -0.13*** -0.02  
12. Nationality 0.51 0.50 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.11* -0.14*** 0.39*** 0.23*** -0.14*** 
Note. 
a
N = 6437 for evaluating pairwise correlations among predictors (variables 1-6) and for evaluating pairwise correlations between predictors 
(variables 1-6) and respondent characteristics (variables 7-12).  
N = 404 for evaluating pairwise correlations among respondent characteristics (variables 7-12). 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 3: Results of HLM Analysis: German and Singaporean Respondents’ Trust 
Decision Models 
a 
 
 Germany Singapore 
 Coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. 
Intercept 1.70*** 0.04 1.73*** 0.06 
     
Collaboration History 0.21*** 0.03 0.40*** 0.03 
Mode of Takeover 0.57*** 0.03 0.34*** 0.03 
Domestic vs. Cross-border Acquisition 0.26*** 0.03 -0.08** 0.03 
Autonomy Removal -0.42*** 0.03 -0.17*** 0.03 
Attractiveness of Acquirer’s HR 
Policies and Reward System 
0.87*** 0.04 0.95*** 0.05 
Note. 
a
 Detailed HLM analysis procedures and results can be requested from the authors. 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4: Relevant Results of HLM Analysis – Differences between German and 
Singaporean Respondents 
a 
 
 coefficient s.e. 
Intercept 1.87*** 0.08 
   
Collaboration History 0.22*** 0.05 
Mode of Takeover 0.51*** 0.05 
Domestic vs. Cross-border Acquisition 0.14** 0.05 
Autonomy Removal -0.36*** 0.05 
Attractiveness of Acquirer’s HR Policies and Reward System 0.82*** 0.08 
   
Age -0.20* 0.08 
Gender 0.02 0.08 
Educational Level -0.09 0.08 
Position Level -0.11 0.08 
Acquisition Experience -0.03 0.07 
Nationality 0.06 0.08 
   
Collaboration History *Nationality 0.17*** 0.04 
Mode of Takeover*Nationality -0.24*** 0.05 
Domestic vs. Cross-border Acquisition*Nationality -0.32*** 0.04 
Autonomy Removal*Nationality 0.28*** 0.05 
Attractiveness of Acquirer’s HR Policies and Reward 
System*Nationality 
0.04 0.07 
Note. 
a
 Detailed HLM analysis procedures and results can be requested from the authors. 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
